The nullity of a civil procedural document is not a mere technicality. It is a sanction that retroactively annuls an act that does not meet the conditions of validity laid down by the law - a poorly worded summons, an unsigned order to pay, service on a person without standing. Used properly, it breaks down an entire procedural chain and offers the litigant who fails on the merits an honourable way out. Used incorrectly, it is dismissed out of hand by the judge, leaving the practitioner who raised it in a poor position for the rest of the proceedings.<\/p>\n
The Code of Civil Procedure articulates the entire regime around a central distinction: nullity for formal defects (articles 112 to 116) and nullity for substantive defects (articles 117 to 121). The two mechanisms have almost nothing in common - neither the conditions, nor the time at which they may be raised, nor the burden of proof, nor the possibility of rectification. Confusing them is the primary source of failure in litigation.<\/p>\n
Invalidity is defined as \u00abthe penalty imposed on a legal act when it lacks a condition of validity; the act is then retroactively annulled\u00bb (Terr\u00e9, Simler and Lequette, Bonds<\/em>, 11e<\/sup> ed., 2013). In the procedural context, it applies to acts performed by the parties - writs of summons, pleadings, orders, service - to the exclusion of acts performed by the judge, which are governed by a separate regime. The means of invoking it is the procedural exception, defined in article 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure as \u00abany plea that tends to have the proceedings declared irregular or extinguished, or to suspend their course\u00bb.<\/p>\n The most common confusion is between nullity and three related procedural sanctions whose regimes, effects and consequences for the limitation period do not overlap.<\/p>\n L'inadmissibility<\/strong> sanctions the absence of the right to act. It is aimed at the litigant, not the act: lack of standing, lack of interest, prescription, res judicata. The document itself may be perfect in form; what is at issue is the very possibility of bringing the claim. Inadmissibility is raised by a plea of inadmissibility (article 122 CPC) and has a severe consequence: article 2243 of the Civil Code provides that it retroactively removes the effect of interrupting the limitation period attached to the document.<\/p>\n La forfeiture<\/strong> - or foreclosure - results from failure to observe a time limit. It affects the litigant who has not acted within the allotted time. The late action is forfeited; the act is not irregular, it is out of time.<\/p>\n La lapsing<\/strong> invalidates a document that has been validly filed but subsequently deprived of an essential element. The statement of appeal lapses if service on the respondents is not effected within the prescribed period (article 902 CPC). The document was in order when it was issued; it is a subsequent defect that renders it inoperative. The distinction with nullity is crucial: the Cour de cassation recalled this in a judgment of 21 March 2019 (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, No. 17-31.502), nullity does not enjoy the protection of article 2241, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, as it is not a \u00abprocedural defect\u00bb within the meaning of that text.<\/p>\n L'non-existent<\/strong>, Lastly, the concept of \"nullity\" is in sharp decline. It refers to an act that is so deficient that it cannot come into legal existence. Modern case law reserves it for marginal cases, preferring more often than not to declare an act null and void. Mentioning non-existence in the pleadings is never strategically relevant: it is better to invoke nullity for substantive irregularity, which produces the same effect with a well-established textual regime.<\/p>\n This mapping is not just academic. Since the Act of 17 June 2008, a decision of inadmissibility annihilates the effect of interrupting the limitation period attached to the document, whereas a decision of nullity - whether it is a nullity of form or of substance - maintains this effect (article 2241, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code). Raising the wrong exception sometimes means condemning your own client to the statute of limitations. This mischaracterisation is one of the most serious professional errors in procedural matters.<\/p>\n The 1975 Code of Civil Procedure, inspired by the work of Henri Motulsky, broke with the excessive formalism of the Ancien R\u00e9gime. Ancient Roman law knew the adage Qui cadit a syllaba cadit a toto<\/em> If you get one syllable wrong, you lose everything. The 1807 Code had retained a \u00abcontrolled rigorism\u00bb in which nullity was automatically imposed on the judge as soon as it was provided for by a text. The excesses of this system gradually led the legislature to introduce the opposite adage: \u00abnullity without prejudice achieves nothing\u00bb. An Act of 12 January 1933 made the nullity of adjournment notices subject to proof of prejudice to the interests of the defence, a principle extended to all procedural documents by the Decree-Law of 30 October 1935. The current Code has inherited this balance, but confines it to formal defects only.<\/p>\n From now on, the legislator will distinguish between two systems that obey opposite logics.<\/p>\n The Invalidity for formal defects<\/strong> (articles 112 to 116) are subject to strict conditions. In principle, they must be provided for in an enactment, a grievance must be demonstrated, and they may be covered by a subsequent regularisation. The logic of the system is to protect the proceedings against dilatory manoeuvres: a litigant who has drafted his document incorrectly can correct it, while his opponent who has not suffered any prejudice cannot take advantage of this to bring down the whole trial.<\/p>\n The nullities for substantive irregularities<\/strong> (articles 117 to 121), on the other hand, are more automatic. They penalise defects that affect the very substance of the document: lack of capacity to bring legal proceedings, lack of power of attorney, lack of capacity or power of attorney of a person representing a party. The list in Article 117 is exhaustive, but it covers the most serious cases. For these irregularities, no text is required, no grievance has to be proven, and nullity may be raised at any time during the proceedings.<\/p>\n The following table summarises the differences between the different regimes, which are the first thing to check in litigation before choosing your attack or defence strategy.<\/p>\n Text required :<\/strong> yes for formal defects (except for substantial formalities or public policy); no for substantive irregularities.<\/p>\n Grievance :<\/strong> required for formal defects (article 114 paragraph 2); not required for substantive defects (article 119).<\/p>\n Time to lift :<\/strong> before any defence on the merits or appeal against a decision on a formal defect (articles 74 and 113); in any event for a substantive irregularity (article 118).<\/p>\n Statutory release :<\/strong> not for formal defects; mandatory for substantive defects if of public policy, optional in other cases (article 120).<\/p>\n Regularisation :<\/strong> possible for formal defects (article 115); possible for substantive defects if the cause of action has disappeared by the time the court gives its ruling (article 121).<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n Article 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets out the substantive conditions for nullity on the grounds of formal defects. Its text deserves to be quoted in extenso because it is so densely normative: it contains the requirement of a text, the exception of substantial formality and the rule of grievance.<\/p>\n \u00abNo procedural act may be declared null and void on the grounds of a formal defect unless the nullity is expressly provided for by law, except in the case of failure to comply with an essential formality or public policy.<\/p>\n Invalidity may only be declared if the adversary invoking it proves the prejudice caused to him by the irregularity, even when it concerns a substantial formality or a formality of public order\u00bb.\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n Three cumulative conditions emerge from this architecture. They all need to be verified before a claim of nullity can be made.<\/p>\n First condition: a text that provides for nullity.<\/strong> The principle is that without a text, there is no nullity. The Code, and sometimes special texts, expressly provide for nullity for certain formal irregularities: failure to include mandatory information in the writ of summons (article 56 CPC), failure to appoint a lawyer, failure to serve documents, failure to comply with formal notification requirements. The major exception is \u00absubstantial formality or formality of public order\u00bb. The concept is not defined in the Code and its scope is determined by case law: the Cour de cassation considers as substantial the information that is essential for the addressee to understand the document - identity of the parties, subject of the request, date, signature of the bailiff. These formalities can be declared null and void even if there is no express wording. But the exception is not a free pass: the complaint remains necessary.<\/p>\n Second condition: a proven grievance.<\/strong> This is the condition that separates strategic litigants from technical litigants. Article 114 paragraph 2 requires the party claiming nullity to prove the prejudice caused by the irregularity. The complaint can never be presumed: it must be concrete, actual and directly related to the formal defect raised. The mere inaccuracy of a statement, a clerical error of no consequence, a typing error that did not prevent the other party from understanding the document - none of these constitute a complaint. The Court of Cassation has consistently held that the complaint must constitute a genuine infringement of the rights of the defence. In a 1er<\/sup> July 2022, the Second Civil Chamber recalled that an error relating to the name of a party in a procedural document only constitutes a grievance if it has effectively prevented the opposing party from identifying the person being sued or from preparing its defence.<\/p>\n This requirement is a formidable weapon of defence for anyone whose act is challenged. To argue that there is no grievance is to empty the plea of nullity of its substance. Conversely, for the litigant who is attacking, it is necessary to methodically document how the irregularity has actually compromised the exercise of his rights - which often means linking several defects together to make the complaint tangible.<\/p>\n Third condition: no regularisation.<\/strong> Article 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that \u00abnullity is covered by the subsequent regularisation of the document if no time limit has been imposed and if the regularisation does not leave any grievance unresolved\u00bb. Regularisation is therefore always possible in the event of a formal defect, as long as the time limit for completing the act has not expired. In practical terms, a litigant who sees his act challenged can take it back, correct the irregularity, and if the correction removes the grievance, the plea of nullity is extinguished. This opportunity to rectify the defect has a practical consequence: a litigant who raises an objection of nullity on the grounds of a formal defect must do so quickly, without waiting, otherwise his adversary will have time to rectify the document and have it served again.<\/p>\n The system of nullities for substantive irregularities follows the opposite logic. Whereas defects of form are regulated to prevent delaying tactics, substantive irregularities are sanctioned almost automatically because they affect substantive conditions, non-compliance with which prevents the document from having a valid legal existence.<\/p>\n Article 117 of the Code of Civil Procedure sets out a restrictive list of the irregularities concerned. It covers three cases.<\/p>\n \u00abThe following constitute substantive irregularities affecting the validity of the deed :<\/p>\n - Lack of capacity to sue ;<\/p>\n - Lack of authority of a party or a person appearing in the proceedings as the representative of either a legal entity or a person who is incapacitated; ;<\/p>\n - Lack of capacity or authority of a person representing a party in court.\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n Le lack of capacity to sue or be sued<\/strong> In practice, this applies to an unrepresented minor, an adult under guardianship acting alone, or an undivided co-owner acting on behalf of an undivided co-ownership without the agreement of the other co-owners. The default affects the litigant himself, not his representative.<\/p>\n Le lack of power<\/strong> concerns a person who acts on behalf of another without having a mandate to do so. This is the case, for example, of the chairman of an association who signs a writ of summons without having been authorised to do so by the board of directors, or of an agent ad litem who does not have a valid power of attorney. Lack of authority is particularly common in disputes involving legal entities where the delegation of signature is not well established.<\/p>\n Le lack of capacity or power to represent a legal person<\/strong> This is typically the case for a lawyer suing on behalf of a company that has been dissolved, or for a lawyer acting on behalf of a company when the legal representative is no longer in office - revocation, resignation, cessation of functions. This is a ground of nullity frequently raised in defence in commercial litigation.<\/p>\n The procedural regime for these nullities is much more flexible for the person invoking them. Article 118 provides that they may be proposed \u00abin any event, unless otherwise provided\u00bb. Even more remarkably, article 119 provides that they \u00abmust be accepted without the person invoking them having to justify any grievance, and even if the nullity does not result from any express provision\u00bb. There is no need for a text, no need for a complaint: all that is required is to demonstrate the irregularity.<\/p>\n Article 120 adds a specific feature to substantive defects: the ex officio requirement. Where the irregularity is a matter of public policy - which is the case for lack of capacity to sue or be sued - the court must raise it of its own motion. In other cases, he may do so. This prerogative considerably broadens the practical scope of the provision: a vigilant judge can raise the nullity even if none of the parties has invoked it, which remains unthinkable in matters of formal defects.<\/p>\n The only limit to this automaticity is Article 121: \u00abin cases where it may be covered, nullity shall not be declared if its cause has disappeared by the time the court rules\u00bb. In concrete terms, if the company that no longer had a legal representative regularises the situation during the proceedings, and if the missing mandate ad litem is produced before the pleading, the substantive irregularity is covered. The Court of Cassation applies this provision rigorously: the regularisation must take place before the judge rules, not afterwards.<\/p>\n The procedural calendar is where good cases get lost. As we have seen, nullity on formal grounds must be raised before any defence on the merits. This is the rule set out in article 74 of the Code of Civil Procedure, known as the in limine litis<\/em> Procedural objections - of which nullity is one - must be raised simultaneously and before any defence on the merits or plea of inadmissibility, on pain of inadmissibility. Article 113 states that \u00abany plea of procedural nullity shall be set aside if its author has, subsequent to the act complained of, put forward defences on the merits or raised a plea of inadmissibility\u00bb.<\/p>\n The logic of the system is simple and formidable. A litigant who enters a pleading on the merits implicitly waives the right to rely on formal defects in the other party's document: he or she has necessarily taken cognisance of it and can no longer hide behind its form. This rule is a particular pitfall in summary proceedings, where defences on the merits are drafted in a hurry, and in proceedings with summary submissions, where it is sufficient for an earlier version to have addressed the merits for nullity to be ruled out in the final version. The reflex should be clinical: procedural objections should be raised first, then arguments on the merits, never the other way round.<\/p>\n Substantive irregularities are not subject to this time limit. Article 118 allows them to be raised in any event, even before the Court of Appeal. The only sanction provided for is an order for damages if the judge considers that the late raising of the issue was done with dilatory intent. This is a useful safety valve when a substantive irregularity is discovered in the course of proceedings - for example, when documents are served, revealing a lack of authority.<\/p>\n In addition, objections to nullity on grounds of formal defects must be raised simultaneously (article 116): you cannot raise one objection, lose, and then raise another in the next round. Before the juge de la mise en \u00e9tat, in written proceedings with compulsory representation, any oversight is irrecoverable - article 789 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives this judge exclusive jurisdiction to hear procedural objections, and any objection not raised before him is lost for the rest of the proceedings.<\/p>\n Obtaining nullity is not an end in itself. Three questions systematically arise afterwards: what remains of the annulled deed? Has prescription been interrupted in spite of everything? Do subsequent acts lapse with the annulled act?<\/p>\n The principle is old and clear: Quod nullum est, nullum producit effectum<\/em>. Annulment operates retroactively. The act is deemed never to have been performed, with all the consequences that this entails: restitution of sums paid in performance, restoration of the previous situation, disappearance of measures ordered on the basis of the act. However, the rigour of this principle can be tempered. The Court of Cassation has developed a pragmatic approach: in a judgment of 7 June 2012 (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, No. 11-30.272), it held that the annulment of a procedural act did not necessarily render ineffective all the steps taken in the proceedings. The Second Civil Chamber had already initiated this change of direction on 2 July 2009 (no. 08-11.599) when it accepted that an act that had been annulled could retain certain procedural effects if they did not depend directly on its validity.<\/p>\n This nuance is crucial in practice. The annulment of a writ of summons does not invalidate the submissions subsequently filed if they constitute an autonomous procedural act. The annulment of a writ of appeal does not retroactively render ineffective the investigative measures ordered in the meantime, provided that they have been duly executed. Practitioners must therefore assess, document by document, what survives the annulment and what disappears with it.<\/p>\n Before the reform of 17 June 2008, the logic was implacable. The former article 2247 of the Civil Code provided that if the writ of summons was null and void \u00abfor want of form\u00bb, the interruption of the limitation period was \u00abregarded as null and void\u00bb. Annulment therefore retroactively wiped out the interruptive effect. A litigant could win on the plea of nullity and discover, in a bitter victory, that his action was now time-barred.<\/p>\n L'article 2241, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code<\/strong> has put an end to this trap. It now provides that an action, \u00abeven in summary proceedings, even before a court lacking jurisdiction, or where the act of bringing the action before the court is annulled by reason of a procedural defect\u00bb, retains its effect of interrupting the limitation period. The legislature wanted to put an end to a situation where the procedural sanction was coupled with a substantive sanction that was often disproportionate.<\/p>\n Case law has given this provision a broad scope. The expression \u00abprocedural defect\u00bb is not limited to formal defects within the meaning of articles 112 to 116. The Cour de cassation also includes the substantive irregularities referred to in article 117. The Third Civil Chamber expressly confirmed this on 11 March 2015 (no. 14-15.198), after the Second Civil Chamber had opened the way on 16 October 2014 (no. 13-22.088). A writ of summons quashed for lack of authority or lack of capacity therefore retains its interruptive effect, in the same way as a writ of summons quashed for a formal defect.<\/p>\n Two limitations deserve attention. First, article 2241, paragraph 2 applies only to legal claims. Enforcement actions are excluded.<\/strong> A summons to pay in the form of a seizure order that is cancelled loses its effect of interrupting the limitation period, as the Second Civil Chamber recalled on 1 January 2006.er<\/sup> March 2018 (no. 16-25.746). The distinction between a writ of summons and a writ of execution takes on considerable importance here, particularly in matters of enforcement procedures<\/a> where these two categories of documents are in constant contact. Secondly, lapse is not protected by article 2241: failure to serve a document within the time limit for appeal, for example, deprives the litigant of the benefit of interruption.<\/p>\n The annulment of a procedural act may contaminate subsequent acts. The principle is logical: if the founding act is annulled, the acts that are the necessary consequence lose their legal support.<\/p>\n The most spectacular example concerns the seizure of property. Nullity of the summons to pay in lieu of seizure - the inaugural act of the procedure - invalidates all subsequent acts, up to and including the auction itself. The Second Civil Chamber confirmed this on 19 February 2015 (no. 14-10.622). The entire procedural chain collapses because each act is based on the validity of the previous one. This mechanism is central to the litigation of foreclosure<\/a> where practitioners scrutinise command with a meticulousness commensurate with the stakes.<\/p>\n However, this propagation is not unlimited. L\u2019Article 176 of the Code of Civil Procedure<\/strong> sets out a safeguard: \u00abOnly those transactions affected by the irregularity are null and void\u00bb. The judge must therefore assess, on an act-by-act basis, the link of dependence with the annulled act. Contagion remains confined to acts that derive directly from the vitiated act.<\/p>\n The nullity of a summary proceedings summons, for example, does not entail the nullity of a summons on the merits filed separately (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, 11 October 1989, no. 88-10.881). Each document initiating proceedings constitutes an autonomous document; the nullity of one does not affect the other, unless the second is legally linked to the first. Practitioners need to map out this chain of dependencies precisely in order to measure the real extent of the consequences of an annulment.<\/p>\n A judicial expert's report that has been annulled - for non-compliance with the adversarial process, irregularity in the appointment of the expert or any other defect - is not rendered non-existent. The judge retains the right to draw information from it, provided that he does not base his decision exclusively on this document. The Commercial Chamber affirmed this on 6 October 2009 (no. 08-15.154), and the Second Civil Chamber had already indicated this on 23 October 2003 (no. 01-15.416) by requiring that the elements drawn from the annulled report be corroborated by other evidence regularly submitted to the debates.<\/p>\n The solution is based on a fundamental distinction. The expert report is not a legal document in the strict sense. It is a piece of information, an aid to decision-making. Its annulment prevents the judge from referring to it as full evidence, but does not eliminate the factual findings it contains. These may contribute to the judge's conviction if they are echoed in other documents in the case file.<\/p>\n Article 749 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies that the nullity regime applies \u00abbefore all the courts of the judicial system adjudicating in civil, commercial, social, rural or labour matters, subject to the special rules for each matter and the provisions specific to each court\u00bb. This excludes administrative courts (Tribunal des conflits, 15 January 1990), criminal courts (as article 34 of the Constitution places criminal procedure within the domain of the law) and arbitration courts, which are governed by the principle of autonomy set out in article 1464 of the Code of Civil Procedure.<\/p>\n The system applies mainly to procedural documents issued by the parties in the course of the proceedings: summons, pleadings, constitution, notice. It also applies to decisions and enforcement acts relating to investigative measures (article 175), bailiff's acts (article 649), notifications (article 694) and acts carried out in the context of civil enforcement procedures (articles R. 121-5 and R. 311-10 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures).<\/p>\n Jurisprudence has extended the regime to acts carried out in the context of a lease contract - notices of termination, proposals for renewal - including when they are carried out by ordinary notification (Civ. 3e<\/sup>, 9 July 1979; Civ. 3e<\/sup>, 11 July 1990). On the other hand, notification of a transfer of an undivided right is not subject to this regime (Civ. 1re<\/sup>, 5 March 2002). Case law thus pragmatically constructs the line between acts falling under the general regime and acts subject to special regimes.<\/p>\n The nullity of a procedural act is not a subject where intuition is sufficient. It requires simultaneous mastery of the distinction between formal defects and substantive irregularities, the procedural chronology imposed by Article 74, the case law on the concept of grievance, the mechanism for regularisation and the propagation of nullity to subsequent acts. Each of these points is an opportunity for error, and errors in matters of nullity are costly: a plea raised out of time is lost, a wrongly qualified nullity deprives the case of its interruptive effect, and an insufficiently articulated grievance wipes out the entire challenge.<\/p>\n Solent Avocats works on these issues both as plaintiff and defendant, mainly in the context of banking litigation, collective proceedings and enforcement - three areas where procedural documents are multiplying and where the procedural chain is particularly sensitive to the failure of a founding document. In order to place nullity in the context of procedural matters as a whole, our guide to civil procedure<\/a> provides an overview of the main sanctions and mechanisms. For nullities encountered in the field of enforcement, our guide to enforcement procedures<\/a> and our guide to foreclosure<\/a> take a closer look at the specific rules governing the summons to pay in the form of a seizure and the propagation of subsequent deeds.<\/p>\n A defect of form sanctions a material irregularity in the presentation of the document (particulars, signature, notification) and requires a text that provides for nullity as well as a proven grievance. A substantive irregularity, on the other hand, sanctions a substantial defect - lack of capacity to sue, lack of authority, lack of capacity or lack of authority to represent a party - and requires neither a text nor a grievance (articles 117 to 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The two regimes follow opposite rationales, and confusing them is the primary source of failure in litigation.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Invalidity on formal grounds must be raised before any defence on the merits or appeal, in limine litis<\/em>, In accordance with articles 74 and 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once a defence on the merits has been lodged, nullity is inadmissible. On the other hand, nullity for substantive irregularity may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, up to the appeal stage (article 118). In written proceedings with compulsory representation, procedural objections must in principle be raised before the pre-trial judge, failing which they will be lost (article 789).<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Only for formal defects. Article 114 paragraph 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the person invoking the defect must prove the prejudice caused to him by the irregularity, including when it concerns a substantial formality or a matter of public policy. The grievance can never be presumed: it must be concrete, actual and directly linked to the defect raised. In the case of nullity on the grounds of substantive irregularity, article 119 expressly states that it must be upheld without the party invoking it having to prove a grievance.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Yes, in both systems. Article 115 provides that nullity for formal defects is covered by the subsequent regularisation of the instrument if no time limit has been imposed and if the regularisation does not leave any grievance. Article 121 provides that nullity for substantive irregularity will not be pronounced if the cause has disappeared by the time the court rules - for example if the company without a legal representative appoints one in the course of the proceedings. The situation must always be regularised before the court rules.<\/p>\n<\/details>\n No, since the law of 17 June 2008. Article 2241, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides that a legal claim, even if vitiated by a procedural defect, retains its effect of interrupting the limitation period. The Cour de cassation applies this provision to both formal and substantive defects (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, 16 October 2014; Civ. 3e<\/sup>, 11 March 2015). Two limitations: acts of forced execution are excluded (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, 1er<\/sup> March 2018) and the lapse of time, which is not a procedural defect, does not benefit from this protection (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, 21 March 2019).<\/p>\n<\/details>\n Not necessarily. Article 176 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes the principle that only the transactions affected by the irregularity are null and void. The judge assesses the dependency link on a case-by-case basis. The spread is spectacular in the case of property seizures, where the nullity of the summons to pay serving as a seizure entails the nullity of all subsequent acts up to the auction (Civ. 2e<\/sup>, February 19, 2015). It is limited in ordinary proceedings: the nullity of a summons for summary proceedings does not entail the nullity of a summons on the merits filed separately.<\/p>\n<\/details><\/div>\n<\/section>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La nullit\u00e9 d’un acte de proc\u00e9dure est une arme \u00e0 double tranchant. Bien mani\u00e9e, elle fait tomber une assignation, un commandement de payer ou une saisie immobili\u00e8re enti\u00e8re. Mal soulev\u00e9e, elle est \u00e9cart\u00e9e sans examen et le plaideur y aura gaspill\u00e9 son cr\u00e9dit de cr\u00e9dibilit\u00e9 devant le juge. Le Code de proc\u00e9dure civile distingue deux r\u00e9gimes \u2014 vice de forme (articles 112 \u00e0 116) et irr\u00e9gularit\u00e9 de fond (articles 117 \u00e0 121) \u2014 dont les conditions, les d\u00e9lais de soul\u00e8vement et les effets n’ont presque rien en commun. Ce guide explique comment ces deux m\u00e9canismes fonctionnent, comment l’un se soul\u00e8ve in limine litis et l’autre en tout \u00e9tat de cause, ce que l’acte annul\u00e9 produit encore comme effets malgr\u00e9 son an\u00e9antissement, et comment la propagation de la nullit\u00e9 peut emporter des proc\u00e9dures enti\u00e8res lorsqu’un acte fondateur tombe.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":0,"parent":18288,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"page-templates\/template-guide-enfant.php","meta":{"footnotes":""},"solent_domaine":[433,416],"class_list":["post-18354","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18354","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=18354"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18354\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":18355,"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18354\/revisions\/18355"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/18288"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=18354"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"solent_domaine","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/solent-avocats.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/solent_domaine?post=18354"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}The two systems: formal defects and substantive irregularities<\/h2>\n
Invalidity for formal defects: three cumulative conditions<\/h2>\n
Invalidity for substantive irregularities: a more automatic sanction<\/h2>\n
How to raise a nullity: the timing trap<\/h2>\n
The effects of annulment: retroactivity, survival, propagation<\/h2>\n
The annulled deed is deemed never to have existed<\/h3>\n
The interruptive effect of prescription survives annulment<\/h3>\n
Nullity extends to acts that depend on the annulled act<\/h3>\n
The annulled expert report can still be used under certain conditions<\/h3>\n
Fields of application<\/h2>\n
When to call a lawyer<\/h2>\n
Sources<\/summary>\n
Legal texts<\/h3>\n
\n
Case law<\/h3>\n
\n
Doctrine<\/h3>\n
\n
Frequently asked questions about the nullity of procedural documents<\/h2>\n
What is the difference between a formal defect and a substantive irregularity?<\/summary>\n
When should a procedural document be declared null and void?<\/summary>\n
Is it necessary to demonstrate a grievance in order to obtain nullity?<\/summary>\n
Is it possible to regularise an irregular deed?<\/summary>\n
Does the annulment of a deed invalidate the statute of limitations?<\/summary>\n
Does the nullity of an act entail the nullity of subsequent acts?<\/summary>\n