Civil procedure is based on deadlines that structure judicial time and guarantee balanced justice. These time limits come from three distinct sources: the law, the judge and sometimes even agreements between the parties. Accurate knowledge of these time limits is a major issue for all litigants.
Statutory time limits
Legal time limits derive directly from the legislative or regulatory texts that determine their precise duration.
A development marked by acceleration
Historically, the 1806 Code of Civil Procedure provided for a pace of proceedings that was theoretically governed by legal time limits. The reality differed: fifteen days for submissions in defence, eight days for submissions in reply. But failure to comply with these time limits carried no effective penalty.
There have been significant developments since then. Decree no. 2009-1524 of 9 December 2009 introduced strict time limits for the exchange of submissions on appeal: three months for the appellant and the intervener, and three months for the respondent. This development reveals a "calendar approach" to the procedure aimed at speeding up the handling of cases.
Revealing examples
One of the key legal time limits is Article 538 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "the time limit for lodging an ordinary appeal is one month in contentious matters; it is fifteen days in non-contentious matters"..
Reasonable time is another essential category. Enshrined in Article 6§1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it has been incorporated into Article L.111-3 of the Code of Judicial Organisation, which states that "Court decisions are handed down within a reasonable period of time"..
Judicial delays
In addition to the time limits set by law, the judge has significant power to set and manage the time taken for the proceedings.
The judge, master of procedural time
Article 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that "The judge shall ensure that the proceedings run smoothly; he shall have the power to set time limits and order the necessary measures".. This provision gives the magistrate an active role in managing the timing of the trial.
This power is exercised in particular in summary proceedings, where the judge must ensure that "sufficient time has elapsed between the summons and the hearing for the party summoned to have been able to prepare its defence". (article 486 CPC).
In day-to-day practice, the judge may also grant the defendant time to call a guarantor (article 109 CPC) or set the conditions for exchanges between parties in oral proceedings (article 446-2 CPC).
Pre-trial proceedings: a controlled judicial period
The Pre-Trial Judge embodies this judicial mastery of time. Under article 764 of the Code of Civil Procedure, he is responsible for "the task of ensuring that the proceedings are conducted fairly, in particular the timely exchange of pleadings and communication of documents"..
The same article authorises the court, with the agreement of the lawyers, to set a timetable for the preparation of the case, specifying the number of exchanges of pleadings and their dates, as well as the dates for closure, the debates and the judgment. This mechanism partially contracts out judicial time.
Judicial time management and its limits
The judge may grant extensions of time, but only for a limited period. penalties are provided for failure to complete acts within the required time limits These are: rejection of late pleadings (article 135 CPC), inadmissibility of pleadings after the closing order (article 783 CPC) or removal of the case from the register (articles 470, 781 CPC).
This trend towards a judge who manages procedural time can be seen in many European countries, such as Austria (1895), Germany (1876) and England.
Contractual time limits
The third source of procedural delays is the agreement of the parties.
Procedural timetables
Article 764 paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorises the establishment of procedural timetables, formerly known as "procedural contracts". These contractual mechanisms aim to collectively define a predictable and respected rhythm of proceedings.
The aim is laudable, but the results remain mixed. According to some authors, "the agreed timeframes do not reflect an acceleration of the procedure, as the average timeframes are in line with ordinary timeframes". (Amrani-Mekki and Strickler, Civil Procedure, 2014).
Local protocols with obvious limitations
In practice, we have seen the development of institutionalised agreements between courts, bar associations and registries. These local protocols raise worrying legal issues.
How could a local protocol be imposed on a non-signatory outside lawyer? This difficulty has led some commentators to reiterate the virtues of a national code. One Court of Appeal even attempted to declare submissions that did not comply with a local protocol inadmissible (Reims, 27 November 2012), a solution strongly criticised by legal scholars.
These agreements cannot therefore replace the procedural rules laid down by the legislator. At most, they are agreed organisational tools of limited binding force.
That's why choosing a a lawyer with a perfect command of these three sources of delay can be decisive. Our firm puts this expertise at your service by anticipating procedural deadlines and avoiding any prejudicial lapses. Do not hesitate to contact us for a detailed analysis of your procedural situation.
Sources
- Code of Civil Procedure, articles 3, 109, 135, 446-2, 470, 486, 538, 764, 781, 783
- European Convention on Human Rights, article 6§1
- Code of Judicial Organisation, article L.111-3
- Decree no. 2009-1524 of 9 December 2009 implementing law no. 2007-1787 of 20 December 2007
- Reims Court of Appeal, 27 November 2012, RG n°12/02121
- Amrani-Mekki and Strickler, Procédure civile, 2014, coll. Thémis, PUF, n°231
- Y. Strickler, "Délai", Répertoire de procédure civile, Dalloz, February 2019
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